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Defending a Mixed Economy
By HERBERT HOVENKAMP
Review of American Amnesia: How the War on
Government Led Us to Forget What Made America
Prosper, by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016
American Amnesia is a readable, somewhat breezy history of the Republican
Party’s war on government, written by two prominent political scientists. Their
book, which focuses mainly on the 1980s and after, is not quite what the title
conjures. One might expect an historical assessment of the role of the State in
American economic policy and how the war on government lost sight of that
history. A bit of that appears at the beginning, but not very much. Most of
Hacker’s and Pierson’s book is a heavily factual account of the interest groups and
money power behind the Republican Party from President Reagan forward,
focusing on interest groups and politics rather than theory. This is good and
interesting reading nonetheless.
Hacker and Pierson begin with a very brief effort to dismantle the idea that the
Founding Fathers, James Madison in particular, were radical anti-government
activists and that the Constitution reflected that judgment. Rather, they argue, the
Constitution contemplated a partnership between markets and government, and one
in which the government played a strong and essential part. My own reaction to
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this opening discussion was twofold. First, the authors examined very little from
the historiography, text, or early interpretation of the Constitution in order to prove
their point. They did emphasize the extent to which the Constitution was a reaction
to the weak, unworkable government contemplated by the Articles of
Confederation. Beyond that, their principal discussion concerns a collection of
statements from James Madison, showing that Madison was not nearly as laissez
faire about the role of government in the economy as some people have thought,
most particularly George Will. There is no treatment of the Constitution’s conferral
of significant power to both Congress and the Executive branch, no mention of
Chief Justice Marshall’s influential jurisprudence that consolidated and
strengthened federal power while subordinating the role of the states. Also absent
is any treatment of the early national federal and state governments’ very
considerable public support for the development of infrastructure, with devices
ranging from lottery financing to private monopoly grants. Nor do the authors
consider the much more laissez faire reaction that took hold only in the 1820s with
the rise of the Jacksonian movement. Their only reference to Jackson concerns his
abolition of the National Bank, on which they blame a series of panics that
stretched across the balance of the nineteenth century. They do briefly defend the
Progressive Era, particularly its drive to expand both voter participation and
government involvement in the economy.
My second reaction, however, is that Hacker and Pierson are precisely correct even
though they did not document their historical conclusions particularly well. Indeed,
one could go a step further: the extent to which some conservatives and libertarians
have attempted to rewrite constitutional history in order to make antigovernment
laissez faire a significant part of our constitutional past is nothing short of
embarrassing. The original United States Constitution and contemporaneous state
constitutions all contemplated governments that were heavily involved in
economic development. Further, while the United States Constitution including the
First Amendment very largely kept the national government out of the business of
favoring or supporting particular religions, contemporaneous state constitutions
showed no such reticence. For example, most of them insisted that only Christians
could hold public office, and several extended that privilege only to Protestants.
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Many also permitted individual states to use tax monies to support established
churches.
Further, at no time in our constitutional history has the prevailing view of
government at either the federal or the state level been predominantly libertarian.
The period from Andrew Jackson to the Progressive Era witnessed a significant but
only partially successful effort to push the government out of the economy. But the
Jacksonian Era was characterized by even greater enthusiasm for public regulation
of morals, including relatively victimless crimes such as Sabbath breaking or
blasphemy – things that laissez faire constitutional law writers such as Thomas M.
Cooley, John H. Dillon, and Christopher Tiedeman supported even as they decried
state economic regulation.
So Hacker and Pierson are exactly right on the proposition suggested by their title:
the War on Government today is based on a “collective amnesia” about American
economic policy. Perhaps “willful ignorance” would be a better term. In any event,
the evidence is sufficient to make clear that, notwithstanding its rhetoric, the war
on government is in no sense a return to either constitutional or public policy
originalism.
The bulk of Hacker’s and Pierson’s book is not concerned with the earlier history
of economic policy, but rather with the various political maneuvers and interest
group realignments that developed out of the “stagflation” crisis often attributed to
President Jimmy Carter. The term refers to a combination of inflation and
economic stagnation, or slow growth. Conservative contemporary critics quickly
identified the culprit as an American policy developed after World War II of using
active government management to maintain full employment. In retrospect, Hacker
and Pierson note, stagflation seems much less mysterious than it appeared to be at
the time. It was occasioned mainly by the 1973-1974 oil embargo during the Nixon
years, simultaneously producing both slow growth and increasing costs. American
policy up to that time had become far too dependent on foreign oil, which was
essential to American production, and the embargo brought these vulnerabilities
home. They might also have noted that although the word “stagflation” suggests a
flatlining economy, in fact Reagan’s rhetoric about achieving growth by getting the
government off Americans’ back was much more potent than the reality. Indeed, in
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retrospect growth during the years leading up to Reagan was not bad. The oil crisis
took its toll, but mainly during the Nixon-Ford years. Measured by adjusted GDP
per capita, growth during the twelve Reagan/Bush years was in fact quite
mediocre, embarrassed by the eight high growth Kennedy/Johnson years which
preceded it, handily bested by both Clinton administrations, and even bettered by
the Carter administration whom Reagan Republicans denigrated. Differences in job
creation performance are even more dramatic.
As economic performance numbers indicate, the collective American Amnesia to
which Hacker and Pierson refer is forgetfulness about the fact that the United
States has a mixed economy, and over the long run that combination of private
markets and public oversight has served us very well. Rather than the invisible
hand, they develop Charles Lindblom’s metaphor of a hand in which markets are
the fingers and government is the thumb. The fingers alone have dexterity but lack
power. The thumb alone has power and can add stability, but it lacks the ability to
grasp and lever. Working together, however, the thumbs and fingers are able to
achieve far more than any part of the hand acting alone. At risk of being trite, the
whole hand is very much more than a sum of its parts.
As Hacker and Pierson repeatedly emphasize, one characteristic of the revolt
against government was a shift of resources away from production and toward
finance. Accompanying this substantial growth in financial transactions was a
steep decline in investment in infrastructure, basic research, and education. To be
sure, investment in infrastructure has its share of rent seeking – for example,
Alaskan Senator Ted Stevens’ Bridge to Nowhere. But finance has more than its
share as well, a phenomenon that they trace all the way back to railroad financier
Jay Gould during the Gilded Age. As they put it, “Gould ignored the mechanics of
rail and focused on the money.” Indeed, the authors see the deregulation of
finance, the slashing of the highest marginal tax rates, and the upward spiral of
executive pay all as elements of serious problems: maldistribution of wealth,
poorer economic performance, and slower economic growth. We devote too many
resources to pushing money around and not enough to building things.
The rise of the Chicago School, particularly its macroeconomics, also plays a
prominent part in this account. The Hacker and Pierson presentation is somewhat
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caricatured, however, presenting the School largely as a manifesto for smaller
government and ignoring most of its significant contributions. The anecdotes are
nevertheless interesting. For example, Hacker and Pierson tell a story about how
the first ten editions of Paul Samuelson’s best-selling undergraduate
textbookEconomics started out as Keynesian in its macro policy. Later editions
gradually moved away from Keynes, however, as Samuelson aligned himself with
more neoclassical Chicago School macroeconomics. The authors attribute this
migration to harsh criticism from William F. Buckley, Jr., Milton Friedman,
George H. Stigler and other unnamed Chicago School macroeconomists. This
criticism seems overblown, for two reasons. First, Samuelson’s (and later William
Nordhaus’)Economics was a basic introductory text, and basic texts are expected to
follow the leading theory of the day. Samuelson’s movement is equally well
explained by the very considerable shift in macroeconomic theory reflected by the
demise of traditional Keynesianism, the collapse of Bretton Woods monetary
policy, and a little later the stagflation crisis. The new theory reintroduced
neoclassical price theory into macro. Quite aside from negative reviews, a
responsible author of an undergraduate text in Samuelson’s position would have
reflected the changes.
Second, on this particular issue a stronger case can be made that it was Keynes
who was the historical outlier, with his broad rejection of self-clearing markets and
full employment equilibrium, as well as his belief in temporary deficit spending in
order to stimulate labor. It is worth remembering that the federal government
neverintentionally produced annualized deficit budgets prior to the Second New
Deal. Keynesian theory certainly did not harken back to the Constitutional or
Jacksonian periods. Through most of the classical period up to the Progressive Era,
economists generally believed that most markets cleared at efficient levels of
output. In fact, aside from a few extreme cases of natural monopoly, most of our
theories of market failure were created during the period from 1890 to 1935, with
the incorporation into microeconomic models of fixed costs and product
differentiation. On this point, Keynes did little more than share a belief, together
with the microeconomists of his generation (mainly Robinson and Chamberlin),
that market failure was more common than had previously been appreciated.
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Nevertheless, when it was published in 1936 the General Theory took economics
and policy making by storm, caught Roosevelt’s attention, and became a central
symbol of the Second New Deal. Prior to that time and all the way back through
the nineteenth century American monetary and employment policy were more
classical or neoclassical. Indeed, prior to the New Deal management of
employment was not a concern of federal policy at all, and the states did little more
than attempt to regulate wages and working conditions.
As any good story, Hacker and Pierson’s book has its share of villains. Most
prominent are Charles and David Koch and the various foundations and centers
that they have financed. All are dedicated to the promotion of libertarian policies,
supportive of deregulation, and particularly hostile toward increased taxes. “Fewer
groups have assembled more resources or amassed more power … and few have
done more to shape the world we occupy today.” They suggest that the Kochs
might have been even more influential except for their insistence on excessive
downstream control. For example, while other foundations typically funded
academic and research projects without regard to ideology, the Koch Foundations
was highly selective and often becoming involved in post-grant management. Their
Club for Growth, ironically, has fueled policies that have actually retarded
economic growth, although they did redistribute more wealth. Hacker and Pierson
describe the Club for Growth’s influence by giving an account of a Fox News
Republican presidential debate in Iowa in 2011, in which all eight candidates stated
that they would walk away from a deal that promised massive spending cuts if it
also included even modest tax increases. I find it hard to believe that the Kochs
have had as much influence on the Republican right as Hacker and Pierson
suggest, but the facts are powerful.
Another villain that appears prominently is Ayn Rand, the Russian-born libertarian
author of The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged. When she did most of her writing
in the 1940s and 1950s she was regarded as something of a quack, but later she
became a darling author of more libertarian republicans. One interesting episode
concerns the Koch brothers’ heavy involvement in the Cato Institute, including
their role in selecting an Ayn Rand disciple as its head. Interestingly, Ayn Rand’s
own well documented preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the cold war was
not what fueled post-Reagan anti-statism. To the contrary, Hacker and Pierson
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suggest that a bigger factor was the end of the cold war and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The resulting vacuum reduced the pressure on the United States to
compete. Before that, the perceived Soviet threat induced a significant investment
in infrastructure and R & D, including public funding for a national highway
system, massive increases in education funding, dam construction including the
Saint Lawrence Seaway, and the establishment of NASA and a national space
program. The irony is that the current policies of the Republican right are
significantly a result of lack of competition.
One group that is very largely absent from Hacker’s and Pierson’s account are
Christian evangelicals, who have made up an important component of the
Republican base since the Reagan years. In their picture, which seems
fundamentally accurate, when the right gets around to talking about tax policy,
privatization of the economy, or deregulation, Christian evangelicals are simply
not at the table. As they conclude, “The tight alliance of conservative Christian
voters and the GOP … has given the top a substantial base of middle-income
voters who side with the party mostly for noneconomic reasons.” Because of
parallel Republican commitments to evangelical positions on abortion, gay
marriage and similar issues the Party has had “greater freedom to head right on
economic issues without worrying as much about the electoral support of their
least-well-off backers.” The irony, as Hacker and Pierson tell it, is that not only do
evangelicals vote contrary to their own independent economic interest, but they
also produce high turnouts, consistently greater than nearly all Democratic party
groups. It’s a twisted picture, of a group voting against most of their own economic
interests, and at very high turnout levels, because they are aligned with the
Republican right’s other views.
My own belief is that this story is a little more complicated than Hacker and
Pierson present it. The Party has not been able to field a true conservative or
libertarian presidential candidate since the Goldwater debacle in 1964, although
that may repeat in 2016. Reagan produced plenty of adorable rhetoric but his
policies overall were quite moderate by comparison. The two Bushes came a little
closer, but both McCain and Romney were at least closet moderates whose
conservative credentials were often in doubt. In sum, the message is more mixed
than the authors portray.
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Hacker’s and Pierson’s larger point seems spot on, however. The brand of
conservatism or libertarianism that has captured the Republican Party over the past
three decades has not been a success, has been found out, has done serious
damages to the Republican Party, and has very likely run its course, particularly
given a younger generation that is less religious, more socially tolerant, and
generally more to the left on economic issues. The move to the right has simply not
lived up to expectations. Economically, it has significantly underperformed the
more interventionist policies that preceded it. Its antigovernment rhetoric is both
divisive and counterproductive for anyone who believes that economic growth can
and must lift all boats. As they note in conclusion, over American history the
“mixed economy remains a spectacular achievement” producing “unprecedented
prosperity.” Indeed, the antigovernment movement that has captured the
Republican party today will likely be viewed as one of the greatest and most
spectacular instances of special interest rent-seeking in history.
Posted on 9 May 2016
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